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Defining a cooperative as any form of alliance formed by agricultural producers for 
their mutual benefit, the objective of this paper is to examine the linkages between 
four bodies of theory (transaction cost analysis, the resource-based theory of the 
firm (RBV), social network theory and theories of trust and cooperation) to the 
design, governance and operation of three types of cooperative; traditional, “new 
generation” and learning networks. The approach is also applicable to relationships 
between individual cooperatives or cooperatives and proprietary companies. Two 
case studies illustrate both support for the theory and also generate additional 
insights 
 
The paper begins with a discussion of theories of business-to-business relationships. 
This is followed by a brief description of the three types of cooperative.  The 
implications of the four selected bodies of theory for the design, governance and 
management of the three types of cooperatives are discussed. The two case studies 
are followed by the Overview and Conclusions 
 




Business-to-business (B to B) relationships occur in both vertical (supplier/customer 
relationships) and horizontal dimensions (between firms at the same level in the 
supply chain). The literature is predominantly focussed on the vertical dimension. 
In both dimensions, organisational structures range from “arms length” 
relationships between firms (as in the economic model of perfect competition) to 
administrative control, where all activities are under the control of one firm 
(Schaffner, Schroder and Earle, 1998). In between these two extremes lies the 
reality of most B to B relationships where they are managed through a range of 
formal or informal contracts and alliances.  
 
Relationship strategy is broadly defined as firms managing B to B relationships to 
achieve mutually beneficial ends. Child and Faulkner (1998) point out that there 
appears to be no unified theory or approach to provide the basis for understanding 
relationship strategy and list eight bodies of theory that provide “useful, but partial 
insights” (page 17). These eight theoretical perspectives are:  
 
1.  Economics: 
•  Market power theory 
•  Transaction cost economics 
•  Agency theory 
•  Increasing returns theory 
2.  Game Theory 
3.  Strategic Management Theory 
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4.  Organization Theory  
•  Resource dependence  
•  Organization of alliances  
 
To this list, we might add further contributions from theories of trust and 
cooperation, leadership, social network theory.  Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
(1996), suggest that failure to include social and strategic explanations creates an 
impoverished view of alliance formation and management. 
 
Our selection of four bodies of theory is based on their perceived relevance to 
agricultural cooperatives. However, we recognise that a case could be made for the 
inclusion of alternative theoretical viewpoints – for example agency theory in the 
examination of the relationship between the members, board and management of a 
cooperative. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) has traditionally been applied to relationships 
between the firm and its suppliers or customers. Coase (1937) argued that market 
transactions between independent firms are costly, and that vertical integration 
may be able to reduce these costs by internalising activities, previously carried out 
by independent firms, within a single firm (Clemons and Row, 1992). Thus, TCA 
provides a vehicle for determining the boundaries of the firm that minimise the sum 
of production, distribution and transaction costs (Williamson, 1971). 
 
Asset specificity is a key dimension of TCA. It occurs when the firm makes sizable 
investments in assets specific to ongoing relationships with suppliers, customers, or 
alliance partners (Knoeber, 1989). Once in place, these relation-specific assets 
generate the incentive for opportunistic behaviour. A balanced investment 
commitment between the parties to the transaction, contracts designed to 
discourage opportunism, vertical integration, or a controlling equity in a joint 
venture seek to limit such behaviour (Williamson, 1979). However, the effectiveness 
of any type of contract is limited by bounded rationality, adverse selection, moral 
hazard and difficulties of monitoring and control (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
 
All the TCA arguments relating to the limitations of contracts and outlined above 
apply to horizontal alliances (Gulati, 1998). In addition, alliances that involve 
sharing information (as is likely in modern alliances) suffer from “the hazard of 
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The Resource-Based View  
 
In the history of economic thought, the resource-based view (RBV) has its origins in 
the contributions of Chamberlin (monopolistic competition), Schumpeter 
(entrepreneurial innovative activity) and Penrose (firms have unique ways of 
combining resources to generate opportunities for sustained growth) (Chamberlin, 
1933; Schumpeter, 1934 ; Penrose, 1959) The RBV argues that resources that are 
valuable, rare, non-substitutable and, in combination, difficult to imitate are a 
source of sustained competitive advantage for the firm possessing them (Barney, 
1991)   
 
In the context of establishing and managing B to B relationships, the RBV focuses 
on pooling resources to achieve mutually-beneficial outcomes (Das and Teng, 2000). 
The RBV focuses on the pooling of dissimilar resources (for example selecting 
cooperative directors with different types of expertise) but the resources that are 
pooled may be similar (as in the case of dairy farmers pooling financial resources 
and milk to establish a processing cooperative).   
 
A key element in the establishment of an alliance is symmetry in the resource 
exchange process – “firms must have resources to get resources” (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996, page137).  This symmetry must continue if the alliance is to be 
sustained (in a similar way to the TCA view of symmetry in investment in 
relationship-specific assets). The maintenance of symmetry between contributions 
and rewards underpins the “horizon problem” in the governance of agricultural 
cooperatives (Cook, 1995) 
 
Alliances have the potential to do more than the simple sharing of resources; they 
can facilitate the development of new “idiosyncratic resources “which are unique to 




Social Network theory proposes that economic activity is always embedded in a 
social context and that, for researchers, the social and economic dimensions of a 
business relationship are likely to be confounded. (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1998).  
BarNir and Smith argue that the importance of a social network to an individual 
manager lies in; access to information (for example, about potential alliance 
partners), emotional and tangible support, status (through association with other 
network members of perceived high status) and a governance mechanism that 
facilitates  trustworthy and predictable behaviour.  
 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) suggest that B to B relationships are 
established because of strategic needs and their establishment is facilitated by 
social opportunities. Social networks facilitate alliance formation by enlarging the 
circle of potential trustworthy partners. This is influenced by the size of the top 
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management team, the number of previous employers, and the level of position held 
with previous employers. (Eisenhardt and Schonhoven, 1996). Gulati (1998) 
observes that often firms identify new opportunities for alliances through their 
existing relationships and that the manner and extent to which firms were 
embedded influenced key decisions such as the frequency with which firms entered 
alliances, choice of partner, type of contract used and evolution of the alliance over 
time. Positive prior experiences with an alliance partner (or, through the network, 
the partner’s other alliances) creates a favourable environment for the 
establishment and maintenance of continuing relationships (Gulati, 1995) 
 
Socially embedded ties within an alliance may also facilitate its continuing 
performance by engendering confidence and trust, and “a natural deterrent for bad 
behaviour that will damage reputation” (Gulati, 1998, Page 309).  
 
Trust and Cooperation 
 
Trust has been studied from a number of aspects, bringing richness to the 
understanding of its impact in strategic alliances and cooperative arrangements. 
However, Rousseau et al. (1998, p394) point that irrespective of the underlying 
discipline of the authors (psychology to organisational behaviour), confident 
expectations and a willingness to be vulnerable are critical components of all 
definitions.  
 
Child and Faulkner (1998), following a number of other authors, identify three 
perspectives on trust: calculative, “based on the assurance that other people will do 
as they say because the deterrent for violation is greater than the gains and/or the 
rewards from preserving trust outweigh any from breaking it “(Page 48); shared 
cognition – based on the length and depth of the relationship; and personal identity 
– holding common values.  
 
Like trust, cooperation, is defined in various ways. The common thread is that it 
involves proactive behaviour to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes (Anderson and 
Narus, 1990; Schroder and Mavondo, 1998). The links between cooperation and 
trust are that cooperation both engenders trust and requires some degree of trust to 
initiate it. 
 
Das and Teng (1996) argue that both trust and control are needed to engender a 
high level of confidence in partner cooperation. Control is achieved through legal 
structures and contracts. Das and Teng (1996) identify the benefits of trust B to B 
relationships which, as well as lowering transaction costs, include inducing 
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Cook (1995) provides two economic justifications for the formation of traditional 
cooperatives; excess supply/depressed prices and market failure 
(opportunism/holdup). Traditional cooperatives usually involve some degree of 
vertical integration. Thus their establishment involves their members becoming 
involved in two new and unfamiliar organizational structures; a horizontal alliance 
and using that alliance to operate a supply, processing or distribution business.  
 
The shortcomings of traditional cooperatives are primarily transaction cost based 
and have been documented by Cook (1995) as: free rider problems; the horizon 
problem (cooperatives are discouraged from making long-term investments because 
members believe that  restrictions on transferability of shares limit the possibility 
of them achieving a satisfactory return); the portfolio problem (the cooperative’s 
risk/yield profile may not match that of individual members); control problems 
relating to relationships between the members and board, and the board and 
management; influence costs problems (the time and effort put in by particular 
groups of members to influence the board, or perhaps, management directly). Cook 
(1995) argues that these problems are felt most acutely in multifunctional, 
diversified regional cooperatives. 
 
New Generation Cooperatives 
 
One variation on the traditional cooperative model that has received considerable 
attention in the literature is the “New Generation Cooperative” – NGC (Cook, 1995; 
Katz and Boland, 2002; Fulton and Sanderson, 2002). The term originated in the 
mid 1990s in the United States and is now widely used in both the US and Canada. 
The core characteristic of NGCs is that capital is not treated as common property 
(O’Conner and Thompson, 2001). The elements that distinguish NGCs from 
traditional cooperatives relate to: closed membership, tradable delivery rights 
(initially priced to secure the required start-up investment capital), contractual 
obligations to deliver, and (usually) more focus on value-added niche products than 
traditional cooperatives (Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Olson et al, 1998; Fulton and 




etworks are associations of individuals of organisations who share experiences and 
learn from each other for mutual benefit (Holmlund and Fulton, 1999). Networks 
are thus distinguished from traditional and new generation cooperatives by their 
relatively loose structure and limited financial commitment.  Collaboration between 
network members allows them to improve their knowledge base, increase their 
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adaptive capacity, improve information access and increased opportunities for 
flexibility, innovation and learning (Kanter, 1994; Barlow and Jashapara, 1998; 
Newton, 2000). 
 




This section explores the linkages between the four bodies of theory outlined above 
and the three types of cooperative. The first point to note is that the theories 
usually focus on dyadic relationships (recognizing that alliance members are 
embedded in a number of social networks – Gulati, 1998), while cooperatives have 
more than two members.  The limited literature on multiple-member alliances 
reflects the business reality that two firm relationships predominate in the universe 
of alliances (Hwang and Burgers, 1997). However multi-firm alliances that join 
together for a common purpose have emerged in a number of industries particularly 
knowledge based industries and research and development alliances. Given the 
paucity of literature on multi-member alliances, we have made the broad 
assumption that the theories underpinning the analysis of dyadic strategic alliances 
apply to alliances with more than two members. The propositions seem, at least, to 
be intuitively plausible, There is an also an argument for including number of 




From a TCA perspective, members of traditional farmer cooperatives do not see 
themselves as competitors. There is little “domain overlap”. Therefore the TCA 
arguments concerning horizontal B to B alliances have limited relevance in 
establishing the cooperative. The issues identified by Cook (1995) relate to the on-
going governance and management of the cooperative. 
 
Because cooperative membership is, in many cases, fundamentally important to the 
member’s livelihood a strong control (TCA-based) ethos tends to emerge - the 
control and influence issues in Cook, 1995. Monitoring and control issues occur at 
three levels; between members, between members and the board and between board 
and management. The issues are similar to those that occur in joint ventures where 
parties seek control though majority ownership or detailed contracts.  The cost of 
managing the three types of relationship is probably higher than in other forms of 
business and positively related to the number of members.  
 
From an RBV perspective, traditional cooperatives pool similar resources. The 
purpose of pooling is to achieve economies of scale rather than diversifying and 
enriching the resource set available to members. The issue of symmetry in the 
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initial and ongoing resource contribution underlies the “horizon problem” identified 
by Cook (1995).   
 
There appears to be limited research on the role of social networks in the formation 
and governance of traditional cooperatives. However, it seems likely that social 
networks would be a key variable in facilitating the establishment of a cooperative 
and continue to play a role in its ongoing operation (this role may be divisive, as in 
the case of the formation of rival groups within the cooperative membership). 
 
There is widespread agreement in the B to B relationship literature that trust 
lowers transaction costs by reducing the negative impact of bounded rationality, 
relationship-specific investment and opportunism (Child and Faulkner, 1998; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). Madhok (1995) argues that the expected value of a governance 
scenario based on trust can logically exceed that of one based on preventing 
opportunism. The extent to which this argument applies to the three types of 
relationships within a cooperative is an empirical question. 
 
New Generation Cooperatives 
 
New Generation Cooperatives (NGCs) are strongly contract-based. Thus, contract-
related TCA issues would be expected to be significant. There may be investment in 
membership-specific assets required to meet the terms of the contract. 
 
NGCs have a restricted membership of like-minded business people. There is 
potential for a diverse range of competencies to be brought to the governance of the 
cooperative through board membership (an RBV viewpoint). Contracts may be used, 
perhaps with difficulty recognising the TCA issues involved, to utilise supplier 
diversity (for example in the production of premium wine).  
 
Social networks are likely to be important in establishing a NGC. One of the 
competencies recognised in selecting board members could be the breadth of their 
present networks and their ability to establish new ones.  The social networks of 
NGC members can be used to seek new members if required. 
 
On the one hand, a relatively small membership might be expected to facilitate 
trusting relationships at the three levels discussed above. On the other hand, the 
contractual nature of the relationship between the cooperative and its members is 




Transaction costs are not seen as a major issue in learning networks as they are a 
relatively informal type of organisation. There may be an adverse selection issue in 
that members who see themselves as getting the most benefit from the group are 
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also those that have the least to contribute. A related issue is on-going reciprocity of 
member contributions.  
 
Sharing the diversity of member resources and competencies is the basic reason for 
the establishment of learning networks. They have the potential to generate 
unanticipated beneficial outcomes - for example identifying a new market 
opportunity in a production technology oriented network. 
 
As for the other types of cooperative, the establishment of learning networks is 
facilitated by social networks. Learning opportunities are facilitated by face-to-face 
contact in an informal environment. Trust and cooperation are needed to “oil the 
wheels” of information exchange. 
 
The hypothesised relationships between the three types of cooperative and the four 
bodies of theory are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Linkages Between Strategic Alliance Theory and Cooperative Structure 
Type of Cooperative and Distinctive Features 
 


























Tradable delivery rights 
Significant equity 
investment in start-up 







Importance of : trust, 
commitment, shared 
vision, leadership , 
reciprocity, personal 
relationships  







Alliances seek to 
internalise exchanges 





generate their own 
transaction costs: 
-  bounded 
rationality 
-  adverse selection 
and moral hazard 
-  asset specificity 
and opportunism 
-  Vaguely-defined 
property rights 
-  Control issues 
 
Significance: High 
Deriving mainly from 
vaguely defined property 
rights and control issues   
Asset specificity and 
opportunism are 
important in  motivating 
the establishment of 
traditional coops, but 
become less important in 




TCA issues in supply 
contracts. Investment in 
specialised plant and 
equipment may be 
required.. Tradable 




Possibility of adverse 
selection. Intellectual 
property rights issues 
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Focus on exchanging and 
pooling firm resources that 
are rare, non-substitutable 
and, in combination, 
difficult to imitate. 
Importance of symmetry in 
the exchange of resources 
Possibility of synergistic 
development of 
“idiosyncratic resources” 
unique to the alliance.  
 
Significance: Low 
The members of traditional 
cooperatives provide two 
types of resources: 
investment capital (usually 
limited) and raw materials. 
Neither of these have the 
characteristics of resources 
in the RBV 
 
Significance: Moderate 
Contracts can facilitate 
the supply of 
differentiated raw 
materials requiring 
unique resources  
A relatively small 
number of members may 
facilitate their unique 
competencies 
contributing  to the  




The RBV is the 
fundamental reason for 
learning networks. 
Conversely, if 
members’ resources are 
not heterogeneous, the 
learning network is 
likely to fail.  
Possibility of real 







Economic activity is 
always embedded in a 
social context. 
Social networks provide: 
access to information, 
emotional and tangible 
support, status. Facilitates 
trust-worthy and 
predictable behaviour. 
Social networks facilitate 
alliance formation by  
enlarging the circle of 
potential trustworthy 
partners and facilitate 




Significance: Low  
May make some 
contribution at the 
establishment stage. 
Becomes increasingly less 
important as membership 
increases and the 
cooperative matures and 




people in a rural 
community are likely to 
have multiple network 
linkages. Similarity in  
status may be significant. 












sometimes lonely nature 
of farming, the 
emotional support 







Key ideas: Confident 
expectations and a 
willingness to be 
vulnerable 
Dimensions of trust : 
-  Calculative 
-  Shared cognition 












At a fundamental level, 
members place their trust 
in the concept of a 
cooperative as a way of 
marketing their output.  
This trust is however, more 
of a religious nature than a 
behaviour that meets any 
of the three dimensions of 
trust.  Cooperative 
members certainly behave 
in a  way that seeks to 
achieve mutually 
beneficial outcomes when 
the cooperative is 
established  but  
“cooperation” in this sense 






and a willingness to be 
vulnerable are required 
for the cooperative to be 
established. A relatively 
small number of like-
minded members of 
similar status should 
facilitate trust and 
cooperation. On the other 




arrangements for the 
supply of raw materials 
and trading delivery 
rights diminishes both 
the need and motivation 
for trust and cooperation 
between individual 
members and also 
between members and 




Good potential for trust 
and cooperation based 
on shared cognitions 
and values.  
Opportunities for pre-
emptive cooperative 
behaviour (cf Prisoners’ 
Dilemma Game) and 
“Tit For Tat”.  
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The implications and conclusions from Table 1 are discussed following two case 
studies. 
 
Two Case Studies 
 
The following case studies provide examples of two different types of cooperatives 
each with their own distinctive features and highlight a number of the insights 
developed in Table 1. Tatura Milk Industries was established as a traditional 
cooperative that has taken on many of the feature associated with New Generation 
Cooperatives such as value adding, reliance on information sharing alliances and 
investment in specialised resources. 
 
Riverine Plains was established as a learning (through practical on farm research) 
and knowledge sharing network. Members have a very limited financial 
commitment to the group but place a high value on social networks, trust and 
cooperation. The sharing of resources in the form of technology, know-how, 
information and at times emotional support (eg unfavourable seasonal conditions 
such as drought when more complex decision making is required) being the core 
principles of the network. 
 
Case Study 1:  
 
Tatura Milk Industries: Competitive Advantage Through Alliances 
 
Tatura Milk Industries (TMI) was established in 1907. It has remained an 
independent cooperative in the face of increasing concentration through mergers 
and acquisitions. Exports comprise 60 percent of sales. 
 
Tatura Milk Industries (TMI) could be described as a traditional cooperative that 
has reshaped itself. TMI have attempted to address some of the shortcoming of 
traditional cooperatives by incorporating some aspects of new the generation 
cooperative model, it is a defined member cooperative with all members being active 
shareholders. The active membership rule ensures that producers are able to 
redeem shares on exit, at an independently-determined valuation, overcoming the 
problem of share transfer associated with traditional cooperatives.  A further 
distinctive feature of TMI has been its willingness to commit to a strategic network 
through a series of strategic alliances. These alliances have focused on value added 
products. The alliances that have been developed include knowledge based R&D 
alliances with Tatua a New Zealand Dairy Cooperative, Ingredia a dairy processor 
based in France, and Andadis a biomedical company in Australia. TMI has sought 
out these alliances to complement their own strategic position in the market and 
build on their capabilities, including access to milk supply and specialist colostrum 
collection techniques as well as particular processing expertise.  
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TMI has an extended alliance network. Each alliance is unique in its own way but 
each is based on a strong foundation of trust. This supports Gulati (1998) who 
argues that firms having prior alliances are more likely to enter into new ones 
 
The alliance with Tatua is based on resource complementarity, with Tatua having a 
very strong research and development philosophy which supports the TMI strategy 
of focusing on value added product. These similarities in philosophy, background, 
size and focus on value-added products, have contributed to the development of a 
strong trusting relationship based on mutual understanding and respect that has 
facilitated openness in information sharing and knowledge transfer. Social network 
theory contributes much to understanding the impetus for such an alliance. Social 
networks can serve as important basis for enforceable or deterrence based trust 
(Burt and Knez, 1995). This shared understanding motivates “good behaviour” by 
both parties as each partner is aware that the other has much to lose from behaving 
opportunistically and in turn enhances confidence in each other (Gulati, 1998).  
 
The alliance with Ingredia, a French cooperative was formalized in 2004.  
Ingredia is a similar sized farmer based processing cooperative that also focuses on 
value added products particularly in the functional foods area. Ingredia were keen 
to develop a relationship with TMI as changes in the dairy industry in France 
threaten the sustainability of current milk flow volumes. The attraction for both 
companies in developing the alliance was the similarities in background size 
strategy and philosophy. Ingredia have strong R&D capabilities while the 
processing capabilities of TMI complement their R&D focus. The initial alliance 
provides a platform for future shared innovation. 
 
The alliance with Anadis exhibits a number of characteristics consistent with the 
RBV as discussed by Barney, (1991) whereby the alliance creates a set of resources 
that met the conditions necessary to develop a sustained competitive advantage 
through resource sharing ie valuable (colostrum is high value) rare (has been 
difficult to access) imperfectly imitable (patented colostrum harvesting technology) 
and colostrum is without substitutes.TMI’s share purchase injected over $4.25 
million into Anadis and provided security of cash reserves. Again the Anadis 
philosophy, which is based on the belief that intellectual property is better 
developed and commercialisation is faster with the assistance of other “clever” 
organisations fits will with that of TMI. Similar to TMI, Anadis have formed several 
strategic alliances. A key feature of the Anadis alliance is the “Anadis – Tatura 
Innovation Engine Room (ATIER)”, a collaborative web to co-develop new products. 
The relationships fostered in this group are considered crucial to the success of the 
alliance. Through the strong trusting, committed relationships that develop at this 
level, measurable outcomes that contribute to financial success are ensured. 
Corporate level relationships whilst still essential for alliance success produce less 
tangible outcomes and will not result in sustainable profitable outcomes without 
successful new product development. 
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Overall the success of TMI alliances can be attributed to strong leadership that 
supports the alliance philosophy at all levels and through all functions of the 
company. Alliances are developed in engineering, processing, technical, commercial 
and logistical functions as well as in the corporate and marketing/sales areas.  
 
Governance structures have become increasingly varied, catering for broad diversity 
in alliances. Contracts and trust both contribute to predictable behavior (Gulati, 
1998). The governance structures adopted by TMI generally involve formal 
contracts. However one executive commented at interview that: 
 
“ contracts remain in the bottom draw where they belong – once you reach  
for the contract the relationship is effectively over” 
 
The familiarity developed through prior alliances has enhanced trust which has 
enabled TMI to rely less on formal structures. Similarly Barney (1991) 
acknowledges the contribution of social factors in his discussion on “social 
complexity”. Whilst several firms may all possess the same physical technology only 
on firm may possess the social relations, culture and traditions to fully exploit the 
relationship. In the case of TMI, these personal social relations occur at a number of 
levels which is consistent with the view developed by Granovetter (1985) who 
started that it is not only at the top levels that firms are connected by networks of 
personal relations, but at all levels where transactions must take place. 
 
Case Study 2:  
 
Riverine Plains Inc – Knowledge Network 
 
Riverine Plains Inc (RPI) was established in 1999. Total membership is 200. The 
group’s establishment recognised the need to develop research capability and 
knowledge sharing. It is supported by government agencies and a University. 
 
RPI exhibits distinctive features associated with learning networks; limited 
financial commitment, relatively informal structures strong personal relations, 
shared vision, trust and focused leadership. The focus of the group is articulated as 
follows: 
•  Establishment of a proactive farmer group to coordinate and initiate research 
•  Consolidation of fragmented groups across the region 
•  Development of a group which was able to attract leading farmers who 
valued their membership of the group 
•  Attract funding to support meaningful research. 
•  Support the economic and social development of rural communities 
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“Farmers promoting excellence in farming systems by providing 
quality information, leading research and sharing ideas for the economic, 
environmental and social benefit of the Riverine Plains.” 
 
The success of the group can at least in part be attributed to the strong drive 
commitment and enthusiasm from the leaders in ensuring the momentum of 
establishment was maintained, along with outside assistance from government and 
a University (Trechter and Murray-Prior, 2003). 
 
Discussions with past and current members of the executive committee indicate 
that the leadership team had existing social networks and that these existing 
networks influenced the opportunity, motivation and willingness to purse the 
formation of the new network. This is in line with research by Granovetter (1985), 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) Gulati (1998) and BarNir and Smith, (2002) 
relating to alliances and social networks provide support for this finding. 
 
RPI has continued to develop and grow over the last five years. Strong commitment, 
open communication and support from external agencies are cited as the principal 
reasons for this continued success. This is consistent with Harris et al (1995), 
Bessant et al (2003) and Trechter and Murray-Prior (2003). Membership 
enthusiasm and support is maintained through frequent communication.   
 
“One of Riverine Plains’ main achievements has been the  
quality of information it has been able to present, both through a  
range of seminars and an annual publication” 
 
Social networks and emotional support, that are important features of the Riverine 
Plains group, are achieved through a number of mechanisms including field days, 
seminars, local farm tours and an annual tour to other areas. 
 
This is turn contributes to trust which is essential to the successful operation such a 
large group. Decision making and management of the knowledge generating agenda 
is in the hands of the executive committee and therefore members need to trust that 
opportunistic behaviour will not take place, outcomes will benefit the majority and 
cooperation continue long term
1.   
                                                           
1 Whilst the case studies outlined above are not typical of case study research as defined by Yin (1992) they are 
designed to illustrate insights developed through the literature review. Further quantitative and qualitative analysis is 
required to test the hypotheses developed from Table 1.  
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Overview and Conclusions 
The important insights from the literature review and the two mini-case studies can 
be summarised: 
 
•  Transaction cost analysis (TCA) is a major contributor to our understanding 
of design and governance issues in traditional cooperatives. New Generation 
Cooperatives (NGCs) incorporate governance mechanisms which seek to 
overcome the TCA problems of traditional cooperatives, but the contractual 
relationship between members and the cooperative generates a new set of 
TCA-related issues.  TCA becomes less relevant to the design and governance 
of Learning Networks. 
 
•  The Resource-based view (RBV) is highly relevant to the analysis of alliances 
between cooperatives (whether traditional or NGCs) as illustrated by the 
TMI case. The RBV also provides the underpinning for learning networks. 
However, the Riverine Plains case shows that learning networks can be 
beneficial to members without an active and reciprocal exchange of ideas 
amongst members. When the network was established, “leading farmers” 
shared their experiences with the group as whole, but as the group matured, 
it appears that its main purpose has been to provide a vehicle for regionally-
focussed research through government agencies. This knowledge is available 
equally to all members and the reciprocity of exchange between members, 
implied by the RBV has become less important. However, reciprocal exchange 
of ideas still occurs at in informal level through the networking that occurs at 
seminars, field days etc. 
 
•  Social networks are a key element in the formation and maintenance of inter-
organisational alliances by TMI.  Building and maintaining alliances is seen 
as an embedded competence (in the RBV sense) in TMI and included in the 
appointment criteria for successive CEOs.  It seems likely that social 
networks are important in the establishment phase for all three types of 
cooperative.  
 
•  Trust and cooperation are seen as seen as important for the on-going 
operation of the alliances established by TMI and become a basic requirement 
for the operation of more “open-ended” alliances such as the one with Tatua. 
As far as trust between members is concerned, legal and institutional 
arrangements reduce both the need and opportunity for it in all three types of 
cooperative. (Even in the Riverine Plains case, where we would expect trust 
and cooperation to be fundamental, members have, in a sense, been happy to 
distance themselves from each other and leave the running of the network to 
the governing committee with the support of the two (quasi) government 
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representatives. However, the significance of informal networking should not 
be underrated). 
 
•  Related to the previous point, we speculate that there is a relationship which 
might called the cooperative “law of large numbers”, which is based on the 
idea that, for TCA-type reasons, generating trust, cooperation and reciprocity 
has a cost and that this cost will increase as the size of the group increases. 
 
•  The cases bring to mind the importance of other factors we have not 
discussed in any detail, but are clearly significant; in particular the 
importance of leadership and “champions”, not only at the Board level, but 
also at the operational level (where committed people from government and 
universities can play an important role). 
 
Table 1 provides the basis for the development of testable hypotheses. The segments 
of the matrix for which a particular theory is seen to be moderately to highly 
significant, along with the volume of previous research in this area, indicate 
opportunities/priorities for future research.  For example, the application of the 
RBV and social network theory to learning networks appears to be an attractive 
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